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Less developed countries tend to experience higher output volatility, a fact that is, in part, explained
by their specialization in more volatile sectors. This paper proposes theoretical explanations for this
pattern of specialization -- with the complexity of the goods playing a central role. Specifically, less
developed countries with low levels of human capital, or alternately, with lower institutional ability
to enforce contracts, will specialize in less complex goods which are also characterized by higher levels
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Understanding the sources of volatility is an important quest in economics. In a seminal
paper, Lucas (1988) observed that, over long horizons, uctuations in rates of growth are
likely to be more substantial in less developed countries, suggesting a link between a coun-
try's level of economic development and its volatility. Indeed, as Figure 1 illustrates, the
negative relationship between a country's level of development and aggregate volatility is
quite pronounced. Analyzing the sources of this dierential aggregate volatility across coun-
tries, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) show that an important explanation for the higher output
volatility in developing countries is their production specialization in more volatile sectors.
Figure 2 depicts the weighted average volatility of the sectors in which a country specializes
against the level of development. More developed countries tend to specialize, on average,
in less volatile sectors.
At the same time, several recent empirical studies have suggested that openness to
international trade plays an important role in determining economic volatility (see, e.g.,
Rodrik 1998, Krebs, Krishna and Maloney 2008, di Giovanni and Levchenko 2007, di Gio-
vanni and Levchenko 2008). While the empirical literature has variously suggested links
between a country's level of development, pattern of production specialization, trade, and
economic volatility, the reasons for these patterns are not well understood   that is, a
coherent theoretical explanation linking these factors is, as yet, lacking.
This paper develops a theoretical framework in which openness to international trade
leads to specialization in more volatile sectors in poorer countries   consistent with the
empirical ndings of Koren and Tenreyro (2007) mentioned above. In our framework, the
central concept driving the linkage between trade openness, specialization, and volatility is
the complexity of goods being produced. Complexity is dened as the number of dierent
inputs required for the production of one unit of the good (as in Becker and Murphy 1992).
We show that sectoral output volatility depends on the complexity of goods produced in
1that sector. This is because when individual inputs to production are subject to shocks, the
volatility of output will depend on how many such inputs there are. In particular, the more
complex goods are less volatile, as the production in a sector that uses many inputs will
be less aected, on average, by shocks to any particular input (a point also emphasized by
Koren and Tenreyro 2008). By contrast, the volatility of a good that uses very few inputs
will be more aected by the shocks to each individual input.
Starting from this technological characterization of industries in terms of their product
complexity, we model two mechanisms through which less developed countries come to ex-
hibit comparative advantage in the less complex   and therefore more volatile   goods. The
rst, following Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Levchenko (2007), relies on dierences in
the quality of contract enforcement. The more complex the production process, the greater
is the number of parties to production, and the greater is the number of contracts that it
requires. This implies that the relative loss of output due to imperfect contract enforce-
ment is greater in the more complex sectors in countries with worse institutions, generating
comparative advantage.
The second approach, following Costinot (2009), relies on the dierences in human capital
endowments across countries and the optimal division of labor in production. In this second
mechanism, the scope of the division of labor in production is determined endogenously as
a function of the complexity of goods. Countries with higher levels of human capital per
worker have a comparative advantage in the more complex goods because higher human
capital allows each worker to learn more of the necessary production tasks (as we discuss in
detail below).
Thus, openness to international trade moves less developed countries towards the produc-
tion of less complex and more volatile goods. This is the main theoretical result obtained in
the paper. The relationship between economic development and volatility in our framework
is then driven by two mechanisms: the specialization in less complex goods by less developed
2countries and the greater volatility of goods with lower complexity. The rst theoretical pre-
diction { that less developed economies will specialize in less complex goods { is supported
by several recent empirical studies. For instance, Levchenko (2007) has shown that countries
with worse institutions have relatively higher export shares in goods with low product com-
plexity   with complexity measured as the number of intermediates required for production
in each sector. Similarly, Costinot (2009) has found that less developed countries specialize
in less complex goods, with complexity measured as the average learning cost that a worker
must pay in each sector before becoming productive. Finally, Nunn (2007) has demonstrated
that less developed countries specialize in industries requiring less \relationship-specic" in-
vestments in their production { which could also be interpreted as industries with a lower
degree of product complexity. By way of illustration of these results, Figure 3 shows that
there is a pronounced positive relationship between the average complexity of a country's
specialization pattern and the level of development: richer contries tend to specialize in more
complex goods.
The second theoretical mechanism on which our paper relies   that less complex goods
are characterized by greater volatility   has not previously been analyzed empirically in
the literature. In this paper, we provide evidence regarding this relationship. Using data
on sectoral production data from the NBER Productivity Database, we calculate industry-
level volatility measures for some 460 4-digit SIC87 sectors over the period 1970-1997. We
combine the volatility data with empirical measures of product complexity computed from
the U.S. Input-Output tables. Our results demonstrate that there is a strong negative
relationship between complexity and volatility, with complexity alone explaining some 18%
of the variation in the actual volatility found in the data. The results are robust to a number
of controls, such as factor intensity and sector-level elasticity of substition.
In sum, this paper contributes to the literature on economic development and inter-
national trade, by linking the patterns of comparative advantage with volatility. In our
3framework, production specialization in more volatile sectors takes place in poorer coun-
tries and emerges naturally from dierences in complexity of goods and in the productivity
of input factors across countries. The theoretical predictions are consistent with stylized
empirical facts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework
and derives the main results. Section 3 provides empirical evidence on the complexity-
volatility link. Section 4 concludes.
2 Modeling Complexity, Volatility, and Comparative
Advantage
We present below two theoretical mechanisms through which less developed countries come
to exhibit comparative advantage in the less complex   and therefore more volatile   goods.
The rst, following Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Levchenko (2007), relies on dierences
in the quality of contract enforcement. The second approach, following Costinot (2009), relies
on the dierences in human capital endowments across countries and the optimal division of
labor. We now consider each of these mechanisms in turn.
2.1 Intermediate Inputs and the Contracting Environment
Consider an economy with a large number of industries, each characterized by the number
of intermediates z required for production, z 2 (0;z]. For simplicity, we assume that the
nal output in industry z is produced with a Leontief production function
qz = min(q(1);::;q(s);::;q(z)); (1)
where q(s) is the quantity of intermediate good s that goes into production of the nal good,
s = 1;:::;z. There is one factor of production, L, and a large number of ex-ante identical
potential intermediate goods producers. These hire labor to produce intermediates with a
4linear production function q(s) = l. Both the intermediate and the nal goods sectors are
competitive.
Final good producers in a sector requiring z inputs contract with z intermediate goods
producers to deliver the inputs. The country's contracting environment is imperfect. In
particular, after the intermediates have been contracted for by the nal goods producer,
each intermediates producer reneges on the project with some probability 1   . When this
happens, the entire project yields the output of zero. The value of  captures the level of
institutional quality in the country. The higher it is, the more unlikely an intermediate input
producer is to renege. As a result, for a given level of investment into each intermediate good
production, the nal output is given by
min(l(1);:::;l(z)): (2)
with probability z, and zero with probability 1   z.
Since all intermediate goods producers are ex ante identical and enter symmetrically into
the production function, the nal goods producer contracts for the same level of invest-
ment/employment for each intermediate. Therefore, the expected nal output per worker
is given by
z
z in industry z. Thus, output per worker depends on the complexity, z, of the
good, and the quality of institutions . Note that expected output per worker decreases in
z at any level of institutional quality . This is a result in the spirit of the O-ring theory
of Kremer (1993) and the complementarity model of Jones (2008): the more steps the good
requires, the higher is the chance that something will go wrong. If the inputs are \essential"
as they are with a Leontief production function, the lower is the expected output. Note that
in a model with multiple goods, this also implies that more complex goods command higher
prices. While we are not aware of empirical studies of such a relationship in the data, the
prediction appears prima facie sensible and intuitive.1
1It is well documented that more developed countries export goods with higher unit values. Since both
in the theoretical model and in the data more developed countries export the more complex goods, in this
respect the model appears consistent with the data.
5In this setting, less complex goods { that is, goods with lower z { are more volatile. The
overall output per worker is 1
z with probability z and zero with probability 1 z. Therefore,
the variance of output per worker is given by 1
z2z (1   z). We state the following Lemma,
proved formally in Appendix B:
Lemma 1 (Complexity and Volatility in the Imperfect Contracting Model) The






This result is intuitive: as complexity of the good increases, the higher is the chance that
output will be zero, and the lower will be output per worker if it is positive.2 The two eects
combine to deliver the negative relationship that we formalize in the Lemma.3
2.2 Imperfect Contracting and Comparative Advantage
Now suppose there are two countries, North and South. While we do not model contract
enforcement explicitly, we assume that a better contracting environment in a country implies
that the probability that someone reneges (1   ) is lower there. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that the North has a more ecient contracting environment. Thus, N > S.
We can map this setting into the Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson
(1977). Denote by aN(z) = z
z
N the unit labor requirement for good z in the North, and











2Note that the assumption of zero output in case of default is not important for the results. Alternatively,
we could assume that even when the supplier reneges successfully, the nal goods producer can force it to
deliver a fraction  of the contracted quantity of the intermediate good. In that case, the total output per
worker is 
z when no supplier defaults, and the variance of output is simply 1
z2z (1   z)(1 )2. It is clear
that all the results carry over to this case.
3Notice that the only shock, and thus the only volatility in this model comes from the possibility that an
input supplier reneges on the delivery of the good. This assumption is not crucial: the result above extends
to the case in which there is both a reneging shock and a genuine productivity shock, as long as the two are
uncorrelated for each supplier.
6Does an ecient contracting environment create comparative advantage? That is, is the
North relatively more productive in goods with higher z? The derivative of this ratio of











We have just proved the following result:
Lemma 2 (Comparative Advantage in the Imperfect Contracting Model) The
North has comparative advantage in goods with higher z:
dA(z)
dz > 0.
The North is indeed relatively more productive in high-z goods. Though we imposed a
Leontief production function at the outset, notice that this comparative advantage result
does not depend on the functional form of the production function qz.4
The preceding theoretical framework, while admittedly highly stylized, serves to illus-
trate two key ideas. First, output volatility is driven by product complexity. And second,
better (worse) contracting environments can therefore generate comparative advantage in
less (more) volatile goods. If we expect the eciency of the contracting environment to
improve with development, we obtain specialization in more volatile goods in less developed
countries { consistent with the empirical ndings of Koren and Tenreyro (2007) discussed
above.
2.3 Human Capital and the Division of Labor
Our second modeling approach, based on Costinot (2009), relies on the dierences in human
capital endowments across countries and the optimal division of labor in the production of
nal goods. As in the previous section, more complex nal goods require a larger number of
intermediate inputs to be supplied or, as interpreted here, a larger number of dierent tasks
to be performed. It is assumed that each of the tasks necessary for the production of the
4This is of course notwithstanding the issue that our modeling approach to the contracting frictions has
a strong \Leontief" avor.
7nal good requires some xed labor costs to be incurred. As in Costinot (2009), dividing up
the tasks among a larger number of workers generates gains from specialization { fewer tasks
taken on by a single worker implies lower xed costs incurred per worker, thereby raising
output per worker. On the other hand, since workers are subject to random productivity
shocks, complementarity in production implies that expected level of output is lower with
a larger number of workers.5 In the analysis that follows, we see how the trade-o between
these two forces determines optimal team size used in production (and thus unit production
costs) as a function of complexity. Then we will examine how, in this context, countries with
high human capital workers have comparative advantage in the production of more complex
goods.
Once again, consider an economy with many goods indexed by z 2 (0;  z]. Each good is
produced with a Leontief technology requiring z tasks to be performed. Let s 2 (0;z] denote
a particular task that must be performed in order to produce good z, and let q(s) be the




The economy is populated by L workers, each with productivity h. There are xed costs
associated with performing each task s. In particular, a worker must rst spend 1 unit of
labor learning to perform each task. Let N be the team size that characterizes production of
a good with complexity z. The rst question we ask is what is the team size that maximizes
output per worker in sector z.
With a team of size N, each team member specializes in z
N tasks, and allocates her
endowment of labor equally to each of them. Therefore, after paying the xed cost to learn
these tasks, each worker has h  z
N units of labor to spend on production. Hence, each worker





units of labor to each task.
5This point has been emphasized recently by Jones (2008).
8After paying the xed costs, each worker receives a productivity shock ", aecting her








of each task s. Plugging equation (6) into (5), it is immediate that the total output of this



















Note that, holding team size xed, output per worker is higher, the greater the human
capital level h and the lower the complexity of the good being produced z. This is as is
expected. Furthermore, output per worker is a function of the random productivity shocks
faced by workers. What is the team size that maximizes output per worker in this setting?















where "(1)  minn=1;:::;N "n is the rst order statistic associated with the sample of N out-
comes of a random variable "n across the workers in a team (see Appendix A).
For the sake of tractability, assume for now that the shocks to workers are distributed
" Uniform(0;1). This assumption has the advantage of leading to a simple closed-form
solution for the optimal team size. In particular, the expected output per worker with team







N+1. Following Costinot (2009), this expression










































The optimal team size increases in the complexity of the good, z, and decreases in the
worker productivity h. Optimal team size increases with complexity due to the gains from
specialization that are obtained when the necessary tasks are divided up among a larger
number of workers. The higher is the level of human capital, the costlier a low productivity
draw becomes, and thus optimal team size falls in h. As we will see, the relationship we have
established between optimal team size, complexity and human capital will be important in
determining the pattern of comparative advantage.
Though the model of the division of labor and team size follows Costinot (2009), the
key tension that pins down the optimal team size is dierent in our paper. In Costinot
(2009), the tension is between greater division of labor and the resulting higher per worker
productivity on the one hand, and imperfect contract enforcement: the more workers are in
a team, the greater is the probability that at least one of them reneges. In our setup, the
tension is between division of labor and the greater possibility of an adverse productivity
shock that an individual worker may experience, in a production setting characterized by
strong complementarities, a mechanism inspired by Jones (2008). Note also that though we
choose to follow Costinot's terminology and call the team members \workers," the model
will not change if we think of N as intermediate inputs suppliers instead.
The rst result we would like to establish is that in this setting more complex goods are
also less volatile. Going back to the expression for output per worker (7), it is immediate














We state the counterpart of Lemma 1 for this model:
10Lemma 3 (Complexity and Volatility in the Division of Labor Model) The vari-






The proof is provided in Appendix B. We should note that the result in Lemma 3 depends in
an important way on the property that the variance of the rst order statistic (the minimum
of a random sample) decreases in the sample size. Though this property appears intuitive,
there are no nite sample general results in statistics about how the variance of the rst
order statistic behaves as the sample size increases. However, it can be conrmed using
direct calculation that this variance indeed decreases in the sample size for some important
distributions such as the uniform (as in this paper), exponential, Pareto, and Fr echet. This
gives us some condence that our main results are not excessively driven by the particular
distributional assumptions that we adopt.
A related result is that in each sector z, a country with lower productivity of workers
experiences lower volatility. This is because higher productivity implies lower team size,
which in turn increases the volatility of output.
2.4 Human Capital Dierences and Comparative Advantage
Suppose now that there are two countries, North and South. The only dierence between
them is that the North's workers are more productive: hN > hS. Following Costinot (2009),
we map this model into the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch et al. (1977), by consider-
ing the unit labor requirements in each good z in the two countries. The average labor



































11In order to establish the direction of comparative advantage, we must ascertain whether
the schedule A(z) is increasing or decreasing. Taking the derivative with respect to z, and

























equation (11), it is immediate that
 
hNNN   hSNS
> 0, and therefore the North has a
comparative advantage in the more complex goods, as expected. We summarize the discus-
sion above in the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 (Comparative Advantage in the Division of Labor Model) The North
has comparative advantage in goods with higher z:
dA(z)
dz > 0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: When workers have higher human capital,
they spend a smaller fraction of their time learning, and so unit labor requirements are
lower. Importantly, this reduction is not uniform across goods. In the more complex sectors,
learning costs are more important and the decrease in unit labor requirements is larger. As
a result, the country with workers with greater human capital is relatively more ecient in
the more complex industries.
2.5 Trade Equilibrium
We now specied the pattern of comparative advantage A(z) in two ways: by relying on
contract enforcement (equation 3), and human capital dierences (equation 14). In order to
close the model, we must specify agents' preferences. Assume, following Dornbusch et al.
12(1977), that all agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences, so that each good receives a
constant share of expenditure. Let ! = wN
wS be the relative wage between the two countries.
There exists a cuto ~ z, such that
! = A(~ z): (17)
Let S(~ z) be the share of income spent on Southern goods. Then, the trade balance condition
is given by
! =
hSLS [1   S(~ z)]
hNLNS(~ z)
: (18)
The equilibrium specialization pattern is illustrated in Figure 4. Equations (17) and (18)
jointly determine the equilibrium pair (!; ~ z). It is immediate that the South produces goods
(0; ~ z), while the North produces goods (~ z;  z). As such, the South ends up in the less complex
industries in which production is the most volatile for each rm.
3 Empirical Evidence
There are two crucial pieces of evidence that we must bring to bear to support the theory
proposed above. The rst is that poorer countries do indeed specialize in less complex goods.
This result has been established recently in a series of studies. Levchenko (2007) shows that
countries with worse institutions { which are essentially the less developed countries { have
relatively higher export shares in goods with low product complexity. In that study, mea-
sures of product complexity at sector level are constructed using the Input-Output tables
for the United States, and by examining how many intermediates each sector requires to
produce. Costinot (2009) provides similar results using an alternative measure, which is the
average learning cost that a worker must pay in each sector before she becomes produc-
tive. Finally, Nunn (2007) constructs a measure of contract intensity by combining the U.S.
Input-Output table data with a classication of intermediate goods industries into those that
require relationship-specic investments and those that do not. Nunn nds that less devel-
oped countries specialize in industries that do not rely on relationship-specic investments,
13which could be another way of capturing industries with a low z in the model above.
The second crucial element is the negative relationship between complexity and volatility
at sector level. On this score, we are not aware of any existing empirical evidence. In this
section, we use data on the actual complexity and volatility of the U.S. manufacturing sectors
to demonstrate that complexity is a robust and highly signicant predictor of volatility.
3.1 Data
Industry-level data on volatility come from the NBER Productivity Database that reports
information on 459 manufacturing sectors at the 4-digit SIC87 classication. We compute
output per worker using data on total shipments and employment in each sector. Total
output is deated using sector-specic deators provided in the database, ensuring that we
capture the volatility of quantities. Because the level of real output per worker exhibits a
trend, we compute the time series of the growth rate of sales per worker for each sector, and
take the standard deviation over time for the period 1970-1997. Taking growth rates is the
simplest way of detrending the data. To check robustness of the results, we also HP-lter
the output per worker series in each sector, and compute the volatility of the deviations
from the HP-ltered trend. Following the recommendation of Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we
set the HP lter parameter to 6.25, since the data are at the annual frequency. Output per
worker data may be contaminated by the time variation in the use of inputs or other factors
of production. Thus, we compute the volatility of two alternative series: value added per
worker, and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The sector-specic TFP series is available in
the same database. For both of these, we compute the standard deviation of the growth rate
of the series, though the HP-ltering procedure delivers the same results.
Data on product complexity come from the U.S. Input-Output Tables for 1992, and have
been previously used by Cowan and Neut (2007) and Levchenko (2007). In particular, in
this exercise we use the total number of intermediates in production as a proxy for product
14complexity z in the model above. It turns out that the number of intermediates ranges from
16 to 160, a tenfold dierence. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for both complexity
and the actual volatility (standard deviation of output per worker growth) of the sectors in
our data. Table 2 reports the top 10 most and least complex sectors, according to the total
number of intermediates used.
Using the variation in actual product complexity in place of z in the model, we can
compute the optimal team size N from equation (11), and as a result the volatility in each
sector from equation (B.2). The resulting standard deviation of output as a function of
product complexity z is depicted in Figure 5. Volatility is decreasing in complexity.6
Is the standard deviation of a sector as implied by its complexity a robust predictor of the
actual volatility in that sector? Figure 6 presents the scatter plot of the standard deviation
of output per worker growth against the implied volatility of output per worker constructed
based on our model. There is a robust positive relationship between the two variables.
Table 3 presents the regression results. All throughout, we report the standardized beta
coecients, obtained by rst demeaning all the variables and normalizing each to have
a standard deviation of 1. Thus, the regression coecients correspond to the number of
standard deviations change in the left-hand side variable that would be due to a one standard
deviation change in the corresponding independent variable. The four panels dier only in
the measure of actual volatility used on the left-hand side. Panel A uses standard deviation
of output per worker growth; Panel B, the volatility of deviations from HP trend; Panel C,
volatility of value added per worker; Panel D, standard deviation of TFP growth. Column
1 reports the results of a bivariate regression of the actual on the implied volatility. The
6The relationship between complexity and volatility would be similar if we instead computed implied
volatility using the imperfect contracting model of section 2.1. All of the results are virtually unchanged
under this alternative approach, so we do not report them to avoid unnecessary repetition. To compute the
variance, we choose the value of h = 20. We checked the robustness using all values of h between 1 and 200,
and while h aects the level of the implied variance of output, the statistical signicance of the results is
unchanged.
15positive relationship is very pronounced: with the exception of the deviations from the HP
trend series, the t-statistics on the coecient on the implied volatility are in the range of
5-7, and the R2's of the bivariate regressions are as high as 0.18.
Column 2 controls for other sector characteristics, such as raw materials intensity, capital
intensity, and skill intensity, constructed based on Romalis (2004). As we can see, after
controlling for other sector characteristics, the coecient of interest in Panel B goes from
being insignicant to signicant at the 1% level, while the rest of the results are virtually
unchanged. Finally, column 3 removes the outliers in terms of actual volatility, and still
nds that the relationship of interest is quite strong and statistically signicant.7 Finally, it
may be that what we are picking up are dierences in the elasticity of substitution across
goods. For instance, Kraay and Ventura (2007) argue that developing countries are more
volatile because they specialize in goods that have a higher elasticity of substitution. We use
data from Broda and Weinstein (2006) to check whether sectoral volatility is systematically
correlated with elasticity. Column 4 in each panel reports the results. Because the Broda-
Weinstein data are in a dierent industrial classication, we lose 10 of the the sectors due
to an imperfect concordance. Controlling for it the elasticity of substitution leaves the main
results completely unchanged. The coecient on the elasticity of substition is positive,
and signicant in two out of four specications. Plausibly, sectors with higher elasticity of
substitution are also more volatile.
Rather than use the data on the number of intermediate inputs to compute sectoral
volatility as implied by the model, we can also assess whether actual volatility is posi-
tively correlated with measures of product complexity directly. Table 4 presents the results
of estimating the relationship between actual volatility and various indicators of product
complexity. Following Cowan and Neut (2007) and Levchenko (2007), we use a number
of variables, all constructed using the 1992 Benchmark Input-Output Table for the United
7More precisely, we drop the top 5% most volatile sectors, according to each corresponding measure of
volatility.
16States. Column 1 regresses volatility on the number of intermediates used in production.
Column 2 used the Herndahl index of intermediate goods shares; Column 3, the Gini coef-
cient of intermediate use, columns 4 and 5 the shares of the 10 and 20 largest intermediate
inputs in the total input use. Note that complexity increases in the number of intermediates,
but decreases in all the other indicators. Thus, in columns 2 through 5 we should expect
positive coecients. We can see that with the exception of column 2, all the coecients are
signicant at the 1% level. The coecient on the Herndahl index is not signicant, but
nonetheless enters with the expected sign.
We conclude that in a large sample of sectors, variation in complexity does play a signif-
icant role in explaining sectoral volatility, which is a key building block of our theory.
4 Conclusion
Recent literature has made important advances in understanding the patterns of macroeco-
nomic volatility across countries. It is well known that poorer countries experience higher
volatility. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) demonstrate that part of the higher volatility in de-
veloping countries can be accounted for by the fact that they produce on average in more
volatile sectors.
How can we explain this puzzling observation? In this paper, we argue that international
trade plays an important role. In particular, recent literature emphasized that poorer coun-
tries tend to export goods that are less complex (Levchenko 2007, Costinot 2009). Since
these goods use fewer intermediates, shocks to each intermediate input are more important
for production (a point also emphasized by Koren and Tenreyro 2008). Therefore, less com-
plex goods tend to be more volatile. Comparative advantage in less complex goods, that
could arise from institutional quality or productivity dierences, drives specialization in more
volatile industries by developing countries.
There is one aspect of our argument for which no empirical evidence currently exists.
17Namely, it has not been demonstrated previously that less complex goods are indeed more
volatile. In the last section of the paper we use data on the actual complexity of sectors
in the United States to construct the volatility of each industry based on our model. We
then relate this implied volatility to the actual volatilities of sectors observed in the data,
and show that there is a robustly signicant relationship: less complex industries are indeed
more volatile.
18Appendix A Order statistics
Suppose that "1;:::;"N is a random sample of size N drawn from a distribution with pdf
f" and cdf F". The rst order statistic is dened as "(1)  minn=1;:::;N "n, that is, it is the
minimum value in this random sample. The distribution of "(1) can be derived as follows.
The cdf of this variable is given by:
F"(1)(x) = P( min
n=1;:::;N
"n < x) = 1   P( min
n=1;:::;N
"n > x) = 1   (1   F"(x))
N: (A.1)
Correspondingly, the pdf of "(1) is obtained by dierentiating the cdf:
f"(1)(x) = N(1   F"(x))
N 1f"(x): (A.2)
As an example, suppose that " Uniform(0;1). The pdf of " is f"(x) = 1, and the cdf is
F"(x) = x. Then, the pdf of the rst order statistic is
f"(1)(x) = N(1   x)
N 1: (A.3)
Using integration by parts, it is straightforward to establish that in this case, the expectation







(N + 1)2(N + 2)
: (A.5)
These results will be useful in the main text.
Appendix B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
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19Rearranging, the Proposition holds if and only if:
1   2z
1   z ln
z < 2:
When  2 (0;1) and z  1, it is always the case that z 2 (0;1). Therefore, the result
nesessary for the proposition obtains if
1   2
1   
ln < 2 8 2 (0;1):
We now show that this is condition holds by proceeding in two steps. First, we show that
the function f() =
1 2
1  ln is monotonically increasing throughout the interval  2 (0;1).
And second, we show that the supremum of this function, which obtains when  ! 1 is less




























(1   2)(1   )   ln
(1   )2
=






(1   ) + ln
(1   )2 :
Thus, this derivative is positive if (1 )+ln < 0. It is immediate that lim!0 (1    + ln) =
 1 and lim!1 (1    + ln) = 0. Therefore, if this function is monotonic for  2 (0;1), it
is everywhere less than 0, as required. Taking the derivative of this function,
d
d
[1    + ln] =  1 +
1

> 0 8 2 (0;1):
This establishes that f() =
1 2
1  ln is monotonically increasing in the interval (0;1). We
























= 1 < 2;
20where the last equality comes from applying l'H^ opital's Rule. This completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
























N(N + 1)2(N + 2)
: (B.2)
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6 7 8 9 10
Log(PPP Per Capita Income)
Notes: This gure displays the relationship between per capita income and the standard deviation
of per capita GDP growth, in natural logs. Source: Penn World Tables.

















































































































7 8 9 10
Log(PPP Per Capita Income)
Notes: This gure displays the relationship between per capita income and the weighted average
variance of the specialization pattern constructed following the methodology of Koren and Tenreyro
(2007), in natural logs. Source: Penn World Tables and UNIDO.











































































































7 8 9 10
Log(PPP Per Capita Income)
Notes: This gure displays the relationship between per capita income and the weighted average
number of intermediates used in production, with the weights equal to output shares. Source: Penn
World Tables and UNIDO.




















































0 50 100 150
Actual Complexity
Notes: This gure displays the relationship between the number of intermediate inputs in production
(z) and volatility of output per worker, as implied by theory. Actual Complexity is the number of
intermediate inputs used in a 4-digit SIC sector, calculated from the 1992 U.S. Input-Output Tables.
It ranges from 16 to 160.
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Volatility Implied by Complexity
Notes: Actual Volatility is the standard deviation of output per worker growth of a 4-digit SIC
manufacturing sector in the United States over the period 1970-1997, sourced from the NBER
Productivity database. Volatility Implied by Complexity is the standard deviation of output per
worker implied by the theory, given the number of intermediate inputs used in that sector. The
number of intermediates used in each 4-digit SIC sector is computed using the 1992 U.S. Input-
Output Tables.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs. 
           
Complexity (z)   77.0  25.2  16  160  459 
Actual volatility   0.080  0.040  0.027  0.339  459 
                 
Notes: Complexity is the number of intermediates used in production, calculated based on the US I-O matrix. Actual 




Table 2: Most and Least Complex Sectors 
SIC Code  Sector Name 
Number of 
Intermediates 
        
Least Complex Sectors 
2429  Special product sawmills, n.e.c.  16 
3263  Semivitreous table and kitchenware  17 
3151  Leather gloves and mittens  17 
3131  Footwear cut stock  21 
3292  Asbestos products  22 
3142  House slippers  24 
2397  Schiffli machine embroideries  24 
3259  Structural clay products, n.e.c.  28 
2441  Nailed wood boxes and shook  29 
2121  Cigars  29 
     
Most Complex Sectors 
3088  Plastics plumbing fixtures  139 
3089  Plastics products, n.e.c.  139 
3081  Unsupported plastics film and sheet  139 
3086  Plastics foam products  139 
3087 
Custom compounding of purchased plastics 
resins  139 
3083 
Laminated plastics plate, sheet, and profile 
shapes  139 
3084  Plastics pipe  139 
3082  Unsupported plastics profile shapes  139 
3714  Motor vehicle parts and accessories  148 
3711  Motor vehicles and car bodies  160 
        
Notes: Complexity is the number of intermediates used in production, calculated based on the US I-O matrix. Actual 







Table 3: Actual and Implied Volatility 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported throughout. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The dependent variables are standard deviations computed over the period 1970-1997. Implied Volatility is the standard deviation of a sector implied by its 
complexity as in equation (12), where complexity is measured as the number of intermediates used by a sector, from the US Input-Output matrix. raw material 
intensity=(value of raw material inputs)/(value of raw material inputs+value added); capital intensity=[1-(total compensation)/(value added)]*(1-raw material 
intensity); skill intensity=[(nonproduction workers)/(total employment)]*(1-capital intensity)*(1-raw material intensity), all computed based on the NBER 
Productivity Database. Elasticity is the elasticity of substitution between varieties in a given SIC sector (source: Broda and Weinstein, 2006). 
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Table 4: Alternative Measures of Complexity 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported throughout. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of output per worker growth computed over the period 1970-1997. Number of Intermediates is the number 
of intermediates used in production; Herfindahl Index is the Herfindahl index of intermediate input use; Gini Coefficient is the Gini coefficient of the 
intermediate input use. Share of 10 and 20 Largest Intermediates are shares in of the top 10 or 20 intermediate inputs in the total intermediate input use. raw 
material intensity=(value of raw material inputs)/(value of raw material inputs+value added); capital intensity=[1-(total compensation)/(value added)]*(1-raw 
material intensity); skill intensity=[(nonproduction workers)/(total employment)]*(1-capital intensity)*(1-raw material intensity), all computed based on the 
NBER Productivity Database. 
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